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This paper analyses the interaction between school tracking policies and peer effects in OECD countries. 
Using the PISA 2006 dataset, we show that the linear peer effects are stronger and more concave-shaped in 
the early-tracking educational system than in the comprehensive one. Second, and more interestingly, the 
effect of peer heterogeneity goes in opposite directions in the two systems. In both student- and school-level 
estimates, peer heterogeneity reduces students’ achievements in the comprehensive system while it has a 
positive impact in the early-tracking one. For late tracking countries, this result appears driven by pupils 
attending vocationally-oriented programs. Finally, peer effects are stronger for low ability students in both 
groups of countries.  
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1. Introduction 
The quality of the educational system is commonly recognized to affect economic growth and the 
equalization of students’ opportunities. International assessment programs (i.e. PISA, TIMMS, PIRLS) 
constitute a unique instrument to analyse the determinants of educational quality in a comparative 
perspective, circumventing problems of skill comparability. With the aim of explaining the failure of 
a resource-based approach to schooling production, shown by the lack of correlation between educational 
inputs and outputs (Hanushek 1986, 2003), several studies emphasize the institutional dimension of 
the  educational system and, specifically, the role played by school autonomy and well-designed 
accountability practices (e.g. Woessmann et al. 2009). In these studies, much less attention has been devoted 
to the social aspects of the learning environment in terms of peer composition, social context and broad 
neighbourhood effects. 
The importance of peer variables in explaining differences in educational achievements has been 
emphasized by a large theoretical literature
1, whereas at the empirical level the identification of peer effects 
remains cumbersome as exhaustive determinants of students’ sorting to schools are often unavailable to the 
econometrician (Nechyba 2006). However, since peer group composition depends on policies affecting 
sorting, exploiting cross-country differences in these policies can provide interesting insights to better 
understand the way in which the peer group composition affects educational outcomes. Among sorting 
policies, school tracking is likely to be particularly important as it determines the allocation of students to 
schools offering completely different programs. Following the empirical strategy presented in section 2, the 
main novelty of this paper consists in extending current cross-country analyses on the determinants of 
students test scores inquiring how the interplay between peer composition and school tracking policies 
affects students’ outcomes. 
It is well understood that tracking policies, both between and within-schools
2, play a key role in 
determining the sorting of students from different background and abilities (Epple et al. 2003, Brunello and 
Checchi 2007). Especially early school tracking between vocational and academic-oriented schools creates 
relatively more homogeneous learning environment along observable (e.g. parental background) and 
students’ characteristics that are often unobservable (ability, motivation, attitudes, etc.). In Germany, for 
instance, low ability students are sorted into the vocational track increasing the peer-group homogeneity 
along an unobservable dimension (Dustmann 2004, Checchi and Flabbi 2007). By the same token, since less-
advantaged students have a higher likelihood of being enrolled in the vocational track, the few who enter the 
academic track are probably particularly motivated and/or talented. An early differentiation of educational 
programs often implies a substantial diversification of learning patterns, i.e. more or less oriented towards 
practical and theoretical knowledge, and hence should lead to an increase the degree of heterogeneity 
                                                 
1. See De Bartolome (1990), Benabou (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Hoxby (2000), Lazear (2001), Durlauf (2004). 
2. Within-school tracking consists in grouping students into different classes according to their ability and prevails in 
Anglo-Saxon countries; between-schools tracking assign students to completely different segments of the education 
process at early ages, generally offering general or vocational programs such as in Germany and in many central 
European countries (Brunello and Checchi 2007). Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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between- rather than within-schools. Finally, comprehensive and early-tracking systems are inspired by 
different educational philosophies and hence differ in many other aspects affecting students’ sorting, 
such  as  the number of slots in vocational programs, the share of students tracked by ability, school’s 
admission policies.  
With these premises in mind, one should expect that, for a given level of observable peer heterogeneity, 
schools in early tracking countries are on average characterized by a lower level of unobservable peer 
heterogeneity. Put it differently, it might be the case that the observable functional relationship between peer 
variables and achievements substantially differ in the two systems. This difference should become 
particularly evident when the relationship between peer group composition and final outcomes is nonlinear 
and changes slope depending on the effective level of peers. The presence of nonlinearities is essential to 
sketch out policy implications regarding the optimal degree of students’ heterogeneity. Were the peer-
achievement relationship linear, sorting policies would not have an effect on the aggregate level, but only on 
the distribution, of human capital
3.  
From a theoretical standpoint, peer heterogeneity should affect educational achievements in two ways. 
On the one hand, having more homogeneous classes implies similar cognitive levels and the sharing of 
common behavioural codes, so less teaching efforts devoted to equalize students skills. On the other hand, in 
heterogeneous classes various types of externalities might arise: disruptive due to the presence of students 
with a particular bad attitude (Lazear 2001), or positive knowledge spill-over from good students to average 
and/or bad ones (Durlauf 2004). Overall, which effect tends to prevail is an open empirical question that the 
interaction with school tracking policies can contribute to answer by offering an exogenous variation in the 
degree of unobservable heterogeneity for a given level of observable peers’ characteristics. 
Using PISA 2006 data on OECD countries, our empirical study seeks to answer two important questions, 
which, to the best of our knowledge, no study has jointly addressed so far: 1. Is the relationship between peer 
composition and achievement non-linear? 2. Is this relationship significantly affected by school tracking 
policies? The several robustness checks carried out in our empirical analysis lend support to a highly 
nonlinear peer-achievement relationship and further suggest that peer heterogeneity affects achievement in a 
completely different way depending on school tracking policies.  
The paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly summarizes the literature to which our work is 
connected to and discusses the empirical strategy adopted. Section 3 describes the data and provides 
preliminary evidence on some different characteristics of school policies and students’ performances in early 
and late tracking countries. Section 4 presents the main results based on student-level regressions and several 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
3. To be sure, if peer inputs enter linearly in the educational production function, efficiency is unaffected by the 
reallocation of students to schools and classes; the opposite occurs in the non-linear case (Benabou 1996). These 
considerations have relevant policy implications as long as the optimal level of students’ heterogeneity is very unlikely 
to emerge as a market outcome, given the several structural constraints shaping schooling choices: e.g. admission 
procedures, physical distance, early tracking policies, within-school ability tracking (de Bartolome 1992).  Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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2. Related literature and empirical strategy 
Our paper is related to the empirical literature on peer effects using international assessment surveys. 
As known, two issues render the identification of peer effects particularly cumbersome: 1. the reflexivity 
problem – i.e. the outcome of each student is affected by the mean outcome of the others and, at the same 
time, it affects the outcome of the others (Manski 1993); 2. the selectivity problem – i.e. sorting students to 
schools depends on several factors, such as residence, parental preferences, tracking and admission policies, 
school quality, that are difficult to jointly observe (e.g. Nechyba 2006).  
Because for policy purposes it is relevant to correctly quantify peer effects, rather than to identify their 
exact source, most of the studies ignore the reflexivity problem and estimate a reduced-form specification of 
the relationship between student achievements and peers’ characteristics where the peers’ achievement is not 
included in the set of explanatory variables and peer variables are measured through parental background 
(e.g. parental education or occupation) and/or the share of the mates having certain characteristics (e.g. the 
share of immigrant or female classmates). Actually, since parental background is the single most important 
determinant of students’ achievements, the sign of the coefficient associated with peer levels of family 
background is usually considered the “relevant” peer effect (Ammermueller and Pischke 2009).  
In order to completely settle the selectivity problem, strict data requirements are needed, namely some 
exogenous variations that randomly assign students to schools (i.e. quasi-natural experiments), which are 
very difficult to be verified through data collected by international assessment surveys. However, using the 
PIRLS survey on pupils at the end of primary education, Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) exploit within-
school variations in the class composition to identify linear peer effects under the assumption that the 
allocation of students and resources is random within the school
4. When controlling for measurement errors, 
they find modestly large peer effects and a small difference in the estimated coefficient obtained in 
regressions accounting for the selection bias with respect to the OLS ones. 
Unfortunately, a similar identification strategy is not feasible with the PISA dataset, because it does not 
provide classroom information (apart from the class size) and can at most consent to estimate broad school-
level peer effects. However, for the main scope of this paper, the PISA dataset presents the main advantage of 
interviewing students aged 15, then above the usual age of first track in the large majority of OECD countries. 
Absent data requirements for completely settling the selectivity problem, the few papers that estimate peer 
effects using PISA have resorted to a second-best identification strategy, based on the claim that the omitted 
variable bias is the most important source of selectivity bias. Accordingly, the selectivity bias is reduced by 
adding among the regressors school-level policies and further controls that are likely to affect the sorting of 
students to schools
5. In a study on Denmark, Rangvid (2007) uses the parental academic and cultural interest to 
mitigate the selectivity problem. Quantile regressions allow her to find stronger peer effects for low ability 
students, whereas social heterogeneity, measured as the standard deviation of parental education, has an 
                                                 
4. A similar strategy is followed by Hoxby (2000), Hanushek et al. (2003), McEwan (2003). 
5. It is worth noticing that not including peer variables leads to a misspecification of the correct educational production 
function, whereas including it using a second-best strategy leads at most to an incorrect quantification and (perhaps) 
interpretation of what the peer effects capture, i.e. broad contextual effects or true effects on learning (Zimmer and 
Toma 2000).  Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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insignificant impact on students’ achievements along the entire distribution of test scores. Similar results are 
found for Austria by Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007), which exploit the large number of possible school 
types that can be chosen by Austrian students to control for unobservable factors affecting sorting. The cross-
country study of Vandenberghe (2002), based on the TIMMS dataset, displays a negative and significant effect 
of class heterogeneity (measured with the standard deviation of a composite index of family background) on 
students’ attainments. In a slightly different paper with a focus on immigrants, Entorf and Lauk (2006) attempt 
to distinguish the peer effect of immigrants and natives in different tracking systems and show stronger peer 
effects in countries with an earlier tracking. For the U.S., Fertig (2003) follows a different strategy – 
instrumenting peer heterogeneity with proxies of the caring behaviour of parents at home and of school 
admission procedures – and finds a negative effect of heterogeneity (measured with the coefficient of variation 
in the achievement of schoolmates) on literacy scores. 
In our empirical analysis, we mainly follow the omitted variable argument used by Rangvid (2007) and 
Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007). To be more precise, we extend the common specification of the 
schooling production function used in the literature on PISA scores (e.g. Fuchs and Woessmann 2007) 
including peer variables and their interaction with school tracking policies: 
 
              (1). 
 
The achievement of student i in school s and country c (Aisc) is the resultant of a vector of individual (Xi, 
including family background), school (Xs), country (Xc) controls to which we add school compositional variables: 
the share of schoolmates with certain characteristics, such as gender, immigrant status, grade, etc. ( ), and a 
flexible functional form to capture the influence of peer characteristics related to family background  .  
The flexible functional specification is required as – apart from a linear peer effect summarized by the 
mean schoolmates’ family background – non-linear peer effects can be either captured by the mean peer 
squared, or by the peers’ standard deviation, or by both. Specifically, the square of the mean captures the 
concavity in the relationship between student’s achievement and peer characteristics, whereas the standard 
deviation shows the extent to which this concavity is associated to a greater school heterogeneity
6. To 
capture differential peer effects depending on school tracking, we also introduce an interaction term between 
peers and a dummy equal 1 if the country tracks students earlier than 13.  
Finally, the error is decomposed in a country effect uc, a school effect us and a correlated school-individual effect 
uis plus an independent error term uisc. The school-individual interaction might be a source of selectivity bias as it is 
correlated with both peer variables and achievements. It is worth recalling that this bias hinges upon unobservable 
variables affecting students’ sorting. Under the assumption that these unobservable variables are mainly captured by 
                                                 
6. A specification with both the square of the mean peer and the peers’ standard deviation is used by Vandenberghe 
(2002) and Zimmer and Toma (2000) for similar reasons. Interestingly, literature on the environmental Kuznets curve 
often includes both the income per capita squared and an index of inequality to jointly assess the curvature of the 
emission-income relationship and to investigate the scope for income redistributions favouring emission reduction (see, 
e.g., Ravallion et al. 2000).  Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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other socio-demographic school-composition variables (e.g. the share of immigrants or of students enrolled in 
vocational programs within the school) and school characteristics, peer effects appear correctly assessed using 
“school-level clustering-robust” OLS regressions and controlling for countries’ characteristics.  
In particular, among the many school variables we can control for (see tab. A1), we have information on 
two aspects that are strongly connected with students’ sorting: school admission procedures and school types 
(private vs. public). In the robustness checks, we also add pseudo-school fixed effects – built as the quintile 
of the distribution of the school average family background in each country –, dummies for the evaluation 
procedures followed by the school and proxies of ability tracking within the school. All these variables 
should mitigate the selectivity problem as they are information upon which parents select schools. For 
instance, pseudo-school fixed effect can be seen as a proxy of what kind of school environment parents 
expect to find in a certain school rather than in another, whereas the share of pupils enrolled in vocational 
programs represent a proxy of school type and quality.  
As a refinement of our empirical strategy, school-level regressions allow to improve the identification of the 
peer heterogeneity. In particular, averaging by school equation (1) we obtain an expression where the correlated 
term school-individual is indistinguishable from the school fixed effect us. More precisely we obtain:  
 
                                    (2). 
 
In eq. 2 the linear peer effect is indistinguishable from the family background effect, which was one of 
the individual characteristics in equation 1. So, only the standard deviation of peer’s background can be 
identified, but in a better way; specifically, the estimation bias is further mitigated by taking the average of 
the unobservable individual characteristics within the school and hence reducing the effect of outliers on the 
estimated coefficients. As a result, the impact of background heterogeneity is more likely to be correctly 
assessed and the functional relationship between peer heterogeneity and achievement correctly specified if 
the sign and the significance of the associated estimated coefficient remain substantially unchanged once 
moving from individual- to school-level estimates.  
As a final caveat, school tracking itself should contribute to the identification of peer effects. Because tracking 
represents an additional constraint for the sorting process, less unobservable heterogeneity should characterize 
schools in the early tracking system. All else equal, the differential impact of peer heterogeneity on outcomes in 
the two systems gives us additional information on the shape of the effective peer-achievement relationship. 
3. Dataset and descriptive statistics 
In our empirical analysis we use the PISA 2006 survey that covers all OECD countries and has a target 
population of 15-year-old students, regardless of the grade they currently attend. The PISA dataset records 
several variables both at the school and at the student level (see table A1 for a full list)
7. More specifically, it 
contains detailed information on student’s home background, school resources and a wide range of 
                                                 
7. Since the PISA dataset does not provide information at the class-level, we are not able to infer if possible peer effects 
come from an actual interaction between students rather than from a broad contextual effect.  Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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institutional variables capturing the degree of school autonomy, accountability practices and variables 
affecting the students’ sorting to schools. A rich set of basic individual controls is also available, whereas 
policy variables at the national level are usually integrated by other datasets (OECD and UNESCO, see tab. 
A1). Since PISA-2006 is mainly focussed on science, we consider the achievement in science as our main 
dependent variable and then checks whether results change for reading and math.  
Some of the variables considered here are indexes built by PISA experts in order to summarize questions 
on specific school or individual characteristics. For instance, the degree of autonomy in managing resources 
at the school level is captured either by a vector of highly interdependent dummies (autonomy in within-
school allocation, in hiring and firing teacher, etc.) or by a synthetic indicator built upon these dummies (see 
table A1 for details). The same holds for indexes of school resources and family background
8. 
The synthetic background index built by the OECD and called the Economic Social Cultural Status 
“escs” is our preferred measure of family background as it combines various dimensions shaping the impact 
of family characteristics on the student’s attainment: highest parental years of education (“pared”), the 
highest occupational level quantified with the index of occupational status (“hisei”; Ganzeboom et al. 1992), 
the “number of books at home” and the resources available at home to study (the “homepos” index). Indeed, 
by construction, all these variables are highly correlated with the escs. 
As natural measures of peer variables, we take the average level of the schoolmates’ escs (net of the 
individual one) for the linear peer effect, whereas possible nonlinearities in the peer-achievement 
relationship are captured by the squared average escs and by the standard deviation of students’ escs. 
Moreover, in order to partially account for cross-country differences in the sorting process, we normalize the 
standard deviation at the school level with the one at the country level
9. Finally, other variables capturing the 
socio-economic school environment are included as explanatory variables (i.e. the shares of females, 
immigrants, students speaking a foreign language at home or attending a vocational program). 
The classification of countries into early tracking and late tracking constitutes another important issue to 
address. Similarly to Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), we measure between-school tracking policies with a 
0/1 dummy variable that intends to capture not only the direct effect of tracking on students’ outcomes, but 
also broader differences in the design of the educational system. Differently from Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2006), we assume that tracking displays its effects with a lag of two years and hence a country tracks 
“early” if students choose before they are 13 years old (see table 2)
10.  
Our sample includes students interviewed by PISA 2006 in all OECD countries, apart from France, as school 
variables are not collected in PISA 2006, and Mexico and Turkey as they display an average escs that is a full 
                                                 
8. See OECD 2009 and the PISA 2006 Technical Report for a detailed explanation about how these indexes have 
been computed. 
9. This is because a high heterogeneity at the school level can be due to a high heterogeneity in the country rather than to 
randomly sorting students to schools. However, all results are robust to the inclusion of the ‘no-normalized’ standard deviation of 
backgrounds at the school level. Results using this further measure of heterogeneity are available upon request by the authors. 
10. Literature provides several alternative measures of school tracking policies: Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) uses 
the age of the first tracking choice, Ammermueller (2005) the number of tracks experienced by the student before 
enrolling in upper secondary education, Waldinger (2006) the minimum school grade where a significant share of 
students is allocated in different tracks. Our results are robust to these different ways of measuring tracking. Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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standard deviation below the OECD average. Following many studies using PISA surveys, we also exclude from 
the sample those very few students (around 1,350) enrolled in grades lower than 8 or higher than 11. Finally, as 
we intend to analyze the effect of social interactions at school, we follow Rangvid (2007) and restrict the sample 
to schools with at least15 interviewed students, i.e. we drop schools with less than 15 interviewed students 
(around 6,400 students). Our final sample includes 202,817 students clustered in 6,728 schools (see table 1).  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of PISA science scores for the countries considered in the 
econometric analysis. To emphasize the differences between the early tracking and the comprehensive system, 
we report summary statistics for each group separately. Country means and standard deviations in science 
scores are, respectively, higher and lower in early tracking countries than in late tracking ones. More 
importantly, the dispersion of average school performances is significantly higher in countries tracking students 
earlier. Whereas this result was theoretically expected, the incidence of tracking on school heterogeneity is 
substantial and very large. In fact, between-schools variation in test scores explains more than half of the 
overall variation in the early-tracking countries, compared to roughly a quarter in late tracking ones. 
Differences between the two systems are much broader than this, as it appears evident looking at the mix 
of other policies affecting students’ sorting (see table 2). In early tracking countries, schools consider less 
frequently students’ residence as a prerequisite or a high priority for enrolment, whereas a major role is 
assigned to students’ performances in previous educational steps. In some late tracking countries (especially 
in Anglo-Saxon ones), the large majority of schools groups students into different classes according to their 
abilities, at least in some subjects. Moreover, early tracking countries display a significantly higher fraction 
of students enrolled in the vocational stream compared to the comprehensive group. In sum, this evidence 
seems to suggest that differences in tracking are accompanied by a different mix of complementary sorting 
policies and justify our choice of using a dummy to capture it. 
On the contrary, no differences among the two groups of countries emerge with respect to the distribution of 
the index of economic social condition status and to the share of foreign students (see table 3). The only difference 
concerns the country mean of escs which is higher in early tracking countries, due to the presence in the late 
tracking group of three outliers with very low average escs, i.e. Portugal, Spain and Poland. By excluding these 
three countries, the weighted average escs in late tracking countries increases up to 0.17 (a value only slightly 
below the one in early-tracking countries), while the negative cross-country correlation between the mean and the 
standard deviation of escs decreases from -0.511 to a much lower and acceptable value of -0.157.  
4. Econometric analyses 
According to the empirical strategy outlined in section 2, we analyze the determinants of students’ scores 
in science. We first estimate a basic specification of eq. 1 without peer effects as done in the existing 
literature on cross-country studies (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007). Moving from this benchmark, we estimate 
an augmented specification with peer variables and then analyse in detail the role of school tracking policies: 
first interacting peer variables and the “early tracking dummy” and then running separated regressions for the 
two groups of countries. Finally, we carry out school-level regressions (section 4.2) and quantile regressions, Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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which allow to observe how the impact of peer variables change along the distribution of students’ abilities 
(section 4.3). 
In all specifications of the schooling production functions estimated in this section, four blocks of 
explanatory variables are included (see table A1 for details).  
1.  Students’ Characteristics (only in student-level  regressions): age, sex, grade, two dummies on the 
kind of course attended (upper/lower secondary and vocational program) and two dummies on the 
migration status (foreign language at home and immigrant), plus several proxies of family 
background (i.e. the single components of the escs index): the highest parental education (in years) 
and occupational status, the OECD variable summarising in a quantitative index the family “home 
possessions” (OECD 2009) and dummies capturing the “number of books at home”. 
2.  School Resources and Institutions: class size, school location, two quantitative indexes concerning 
school responsibility for resources’ allocation (“respres”) and for curriculum and internal assessment 
(“respcurr”)
11, two dummies for private and public schools, two dummies for the admission 
procedures, signalling if residence or abilities are a priority or a prerequisite for being enrolled in 
that school. Note that variables on admission procedures seem particularly well suited in order to 
reduce the omitted variable bias due to a non-random assignment of students to schools.  
3.  School Compositional Variables (all calculated net of the individual one): the mean age and the 
shares of females, of “foreigners” (immigrants and people speaking a foreign language at home), of 
students attending vocational programs and our main peer variables based on three statistics on the 
schoolmates family background (proxied by the escs index), i.e. the mean, the square of the mean 
and the standard deviation. 
4.  Country-level controls: the share of students subjected to external evaluation and/or standard test in 
science
12, the age of tracking between different kinds of programs (general or vocational), the 
duration of and the pupils’ share enrolled in pre-primary education, GDP per capita and the 
expenditures in secondary education. In some robust checks, country level controls are replaced by 
country fixed effects. 
In robustness checks a fifth block of control variables is added: 
5.  School Additional Controls: pseudo school fixed effects (i.e. dummies for the quintiles of the 
country-specific distribution of the average parental escs which the school belongs to), controls 
about the degree of school competition and accountability practices internal to the school, two 
dummies capturing if there is an ability grouping internal to the school for some subjects or for all 
subjects (see table A1 for a detailed description of these additional controls). 
                                                 
11. In all regressions shown in this paper, we include the ‘respres’ and ‘respcurr’ indexes (see table A1 and OECD 
2009) instead of the dummies about the single components of school autonomy and responsibility about resources and 
curricula, due to the several missing values characterizing each dummy. Replacing these dummies with the two OECD 
indexes, which by construction have much less missing values, does not alter our results. 
12. The share of students subject to standardized external examination has been shown to be an important determinant 
of students’ attainments (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007). Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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4.1 Student-level regressions 
In student level regressions, three additional methodological adjustments are in order for improving the 
reliability of our estimates. First, missing values on certain individual characteristics are not randomly distributed, 
but appear related to family background and ability. As a result, dropping students with missing information on 
some variables could engender a sample selection bias. In order to copy with this issue, we impute individual 
missing values regarding family background (escs, pared, hisei and homepos variables, see table A1) and some 
individual characteristics (immigrant and foreign language) according to the usual methodology followed in the 
literature (Woessmann 2004). Second, the “school-level clustering-robust” linear regression method is always 
used in student-level regressions to estimate standard errors that recognize the schools as the basic unit of 
sampling in the survey (Woessmann 2004). Third, in order to obtain representative coefficient estimates from the 
stratified survey data, students’ sample weights are used in all estimations of students’ scores. 
In the following tables we present estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values only for peer variables, 
because the sign and the significance of the other variables included is consistent with main findings of the 
existing literature emphasizing the importance of school and country institutional features over school resources 
(see Fuchs and Woessmann 2007, Woessmann et al. 2009, Hanushek and Woessmann 2010).  
In table 4, we present models that differ for the functional specification of peer effects chosen. The 
model ST-0 is the standard model considered by the literature on the students’ scores production function 
(Fuchs and Woessmann 2007), whereas the following models include school compositional and peer 
variables. The comparison between model ST-0 and the subsequent ones clearly confirms that the inclusion 
of schoolmates characteristics substantially increases the fitness of the estimations: the R
2 grows from 0.307 
to values around 0.340
13. This suggests that a penalty is associated both with the choice of including peer 
variables and probably incurring in an identification problem, on the one hand, and with the one of not 
including peer variables and of reducing the explanatory power of the regression, on the other.  
As shown by model ST-1 of table 4, an improvement in the average escs of the schoolmates is associated 
with a better student’s achievement. The size of this effect is also significant and somehow larger than the 
one found by other studies (Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). In particular, a 1-standard deviation increase 
in the average escs leads to a 25 points increase in the student’s scores, that is a quarter of the standard 
deviation in PISA scores, normalized to 100
14.  
In model ST-2, we add also the escs standard deviation to capture the influence of peer heterogeneity. 
While the sign and significance of the linear peer effect do not change, peer heterogeneity displays a 
negative but small and weakly significant association with achievements: a change in 1 standard deviation 
leads to a reduction in the average score of 1.35 points. This result is in line with the ones of the previous 
literature finding a small, but often insignificant, negative effect of heterogeneity on students’ performances 
(Hanushek et al. 2003, Rangvid 2007). 
                                                 
13. A R2 around 34 % is in line with the one found by the two studies using a large set of controls to reduce the omitted 
variable bias in the estimation of peer effects on PISA scores (Rangvid 2007; Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer 2007). 
14. One standard deviation of schoolmates’ average escs and of the standard deviation of escs amount, respectively, to 
0.49 and 0.14. Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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The model ST-3 shows that the small negative influence of heterogeneity on scores does not hinge upon 
the particular shape of the schooling production function, which appears concave-shaped. The quadratic term 
is in fact highly significant and negative. These results remain unchanged if we include both the quadratic 
term of the mean escs and the standard deviation (model ST-4). Overall, mixing students negatively affects 
student’s outcome, but keeping relatively more homogeneous schools around the average is better than 
having relatively more homogeneous schools spread over the entire support of the escs distribution.  
In model ST-5 we consider the interplay between schoolmates composition, school tracking policies and 
students’ performances. Hence, we include also the interactions of the mean and the standard deviation of the 
schoolmates’ escs with early tracking dummy. We prefer to leave aside the interaction between the linear 
peer squared and the tracking dummy as it could render less transparent the sign of the interaction between 
peer heterogeneity and the tracking dummy. As expected, both interaction terms display a positive and 
highly significant estimated coefficient. In line with the theoretical literature (Brunello et al. 2007) and the 
empirical findings by Entorf and Lauer (2006), linear peer effects are higher in the early tracking system. 
The novel result is that more heterogeneous schools seem to exert an opposite impact in the two groups of 
countries: they improve students’ performances in early-tracking countries, whereas they worsen 
achievements in late tracking ones. 
Table 5 shows that this differential impact of heterogeneity in early and late tracking countries is 
confirmed by robustness checks analyzing the model ST-5 for math and read. Looking at model ST-5a in the 
same table, also the inclusion of additional school variables and of pseudo school fixed effects does not alter 
our main findings, in spite of the significant reduction in the sample size due to several missing values on 
these additional variables. Finally, it is worth noticing that the differential impact of peer variables depending 
on school tracking mainly concerns peer heterogeneity. In fact, in the tougher specification with the full set 
of school controls, the interaction between the early tracking dummy and the linear peer effect is not 
anymore significant. 
Table 6A shows that our results remain unchanged when running models ST-1 and ST-2 separately for 
the two educational systems. First, linear peer effects are higher in early tracking countries: one standard 
deviation explains 28.5 and 22.9 PISA points in early and late tracking systems, respectively. Second, the 
coefficient of the peer heterogeneity term is significant with opposite signs in the two systems: early-tracking 
(+) and comprehensive (-). The magnitude of this effect remains modest as one standard deviation in the escs 
standard deviation leads, respectively, to a 2.1 increase and a 2.5 decrease in PISA scores. Finally, the R
2 is 
much higher in regressions concerning early tracking countries, perhaps reflecting the lower within-school 
unobservable noise.
 
In many schools, students can choose between vocational and non-vocational education. Moreover, the 
fraction of students enrolled in vocational programs substantially differs in the two groups of countries. To 
capture these important aspects of the two systems, we interact peer variables with the dummy about the kind 
of school program. Model ST-3 shows that this interaction term is statistically insignificant in early tracking 
countries, but it is highly significant in the comprehensive school system. In the late tracking system, the Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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linear peer effect appears higher for students attending vocational courses, whereas higher heterogeneity 
reduces students’ performances. As a result, the negative relationship between peer heterogeneity and 
performances in late tracking countries appears mainly driven by schools offering vocational programs, 
which are often of lower quality.  
Adding to the base model pseudo-school fixed effects and additional controls does not alter results, but 
the significance of the heterogeneity coefficients in early tracking countries reduces at cut-off significance 
level of 82% (model ST-2a).  
Finally, in both systems the relationship between schoolmates’ family background and students’ scores is 
concave-shaped and of similar size (model ST-3 in table 6A). This result might be driven by the fact that, in 
the comprehensive system, there are three outlier countries (Spain, Portugal and Poland; see table 3) with a 
very low average escs. If we exclude these three countries from the late tracking group, the linear peer 
substantially increases and the square of the average peer turns out being statistically insignificant (table 6B). 
This latter result reinforces our claims that school tracking heavily influence the shape of the peer-
achievement relationship and that the scope for mixing students is much higher in the early tracking system. 
4.2 School-level regressions 
As discussed in section 2, school-level regressions – i.e. the mean score at the school level is the 
dependent variable – could allow to improve the identification of the peer heterogeneity. Recall that, in this 
case, only the standard deviation of peer’s background can be identified, but perhaps in a better way because 
averaging individual unobservables reduce the influence of outliers.  
Table 7 shows school-level estimates which are carried out always including school additional controls. 
In the pooled SC-1 model, a negative and significant impact of students’ heterogeneity is confirmed
15. 
Moreover, the differential impact of heterogeneity in the two systems is confirmed, both in the specification 
with the interaction terms and in separated regressions (models SC-2). Now, the size of the estimated 
coefficients of peer heterogeneity appears larger in comparison with student-level estimates: a change in one 
standard deviation of heterogeneity leads to a decrease of 4.7 school mean PISA points in late tracking 
countries and to an increase of 2.3 points in early tracking ones. As expected, because a large part of the 
performance variation across students has to be attributed to individual unobserved variables (e.g. their 
innate ability or learning motivation), when averaging variables at the school level the R
2  significantly 
increases and again it is still much higher in the group of early tracking countries. 
4.3 Quantile regressions on students’ scores 
A final interesting exercise consists in running quantile regressions to condition the estimates of peer 
effects to an implicit distribution of student abilities. This exercise is particularly important here as the 
impact of early-tracking on sorting could mainly operate through unobservable student abilities. Estimating 
                                                 
15. A change in one standard deviation of the average escs index turns out to explain 41 out of the 100 points of the 
standard deviation in the student attainments. This is not surprisingly as long as, in school-level regressions, the average 
escs identifies both the peer and the individual background effect, which is usually the larger explanatory factor of 
student outcomes (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann 2010). Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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model ST-2 of table 4 for each decile of the distribution of students’ achievements, quantile regressions show 
that the linear peer effect is positive all along the conditional test score distribution and remarkably higher in 
early tracking countries (table 8 and figure 1). Moreover, similarly to previous studies (Schneeweis and 
Winter-Ebmer 2007, Rangvid 2007), this effect is slightly larger in lower deciles while the main differences 
between the two groups of countries pertain the effect of peer heterogeneity (table 8 and figure 2). In the 
early tracking group, its sign is significantly positive and slightly U-shaped along the entire test score 
distribution. In late tracking group, the effect of peer heterogeneity is significantly negative and slightly 
lower in upper deciles. 
In sum, quantile regressions reinforce the previous finding in terms of a significant efficiency-enhancing 
effect of mixing students in early tracking systems, where individuals are probably more homogeneous in 
their unobservable features. Conversely, the picture in comprehensive systems is nuanced: on one hand, 
stronger peer effects at the bottom of the ability distribution would lead to support policies aimed at 
increasing background heterogeneity; on the other hand, a too high heterogeneity might turn out offsetting 
the efficiency-enhancing effect of mixing students. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyses the impact peer heterogeneity on students’ performances in different tracking 
regimes. Unlike previous studies often focussing on a single country, the cross-country dimension of our 
analysis consents us to exploit the variability in school tracking policies to investigate how peer effects 
interact with this important aspect of the educational system. Our descriptive analysis reveals profound 
differences between the early tracking and the comprehensive system along several policies affecting 
students’ sorting and lends further support to our main research focus. 
We confirm previous studies showing that linear peer effects are heavier in the early tracking system. 
More interestingly, we show that the impact of peer heterogeneity changes sign depending on the school 
tracking policies. In the early-tracking system, peer heterogeneity has a positive impact on students’ 
outcomes and the peer-achievement relationship is concave-shaped. In the comprehensive system, we do not 
find evidence of non-linear peer effects while higher peer heterogeneity negatively affects student 
achievements. However, the latter result appears driven by pupils attending vocationally-oriented programs. 
Our findings remain robust to several robust exercises, such as school-level regressions, the inclusion of 
several controls correlated with students’ sorting and of pseudo school fixed effects.  
  All these findings point, as a possible explanation, to a different way in which the tracking system 
affects the sorting of students by unobservable characteristics. In the early tracking system, better students 
might put more efforts to signal their higher abilities and motivations sooner in order to enter the academic 
track. If this is the case, the unobservable degree of heterogeneity should be lower in early tracking countries 
and, hence, the scope for mixing students should take also this ability dimension into account. However, our 
analysis is not able to fully distinguish the effect of school tracking on sorting from the one related to 
heterogeneity in school quality, which is likely to be higher in the early tracking system. In fact, differences Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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in school quality are only partially accounted for in our analysis using the share of students enrolled in 
vocational programs. 
A final caveat is required to use these results for policy purposes. The significant impact of peer 
heterogeneity on students’ performances is rather small both in the comprehensive and in the early-tracking 
system, hence favouring student mobility and the mixing of background might have a cost well-above the 
benefits in terms of efficiency. Also, the large variation in the factors affecting the students’ sorting and 
selection, both within- and between-country, would require further analyses to obtain more limpid policy 
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Table 1: Distribution of science scores in OECD countries
1 in PISA 2006  
 






























Austria  518.4  92.1  74.3  62.5 57.0  43.0  4,648  155 
Germany  523.1  94.9  78.9  61.0 59.9  40.1  4,570  203 
Czech Rep.  520.5  91.9  62.7  65.3 57.8  42.2  5,516  200 
Hungary  514. 1  79.7  57.9  53.8 70.4  29.6  4,245  136 
Slovak Rep.  493.7  88.5  57.2  67.2 42.4  57.6  4,366  151 
Belgium  512.5  96.2  78.1  63.6 52.3  47.7  8,724  258 
Netherlands  525.8  92.2  79.5  51.9 58.9  41.1  4,835  182 
Switzerland  515.1  95.9  59.2  72.6 34.2  65.8  11,181  402 
Early tracking  
countries
2  520.0  93.5  73.6  61.9 51.3  48.7  48,085  1,687 
Luxembourg  486.3  94.1  54.6  76.5 29.2  70.8  4,532  29 
Italy  479.0  90.9  68.6  63.4 52.1  47.9  21,012  696 
Korea  522. 9  86.4  58.8  67.9 35.3  64.7  5,120  149 
Greece  481.3  84.8  64.2  65.0 51.7  48.3  4,651  151 
Ireland  508.6  91.2  47.4  81.5 17.0  83.0  4,557  163 
Japan  532.0  96.4  77.1  68.8 48.5  51.5  5,910  180 
Portugal  488.7  77.9  44.2  63.3 31.9  68.1  4,587  158 
Australia  527.3  96.6  44.7  87.2 17.9  82.1  14,046  341 
Canada  536.3  90.0  49.1  80.7 18.4  81.6  21,516  762 
Denmark  495.0  89.3  38.3  81.1 15.4  84.6  4,363  190 
Finland  564.0  81.8  23.9  78.8 5.8  94.2  4,674  151 
Iceland  489.7  93.2  29.0  89.3 9.0  91.0  3,359  77 
Norway  485.6  92.4  37.8  85.1 9.9  90.1  4,561  182 
New Zealand  529.3  102.8  47.9  92.6 15.9  84.1  4,510  161 
Poland  497.7  85.6  36.3  79.2 13.6  86.4  5,345  174 
Spain  488.9  87.5  41.1  77.0 13.9  86.1  19,286  652 
Sweden  502.9  90.7  34.4  84.7 12.0  88.0  4,318  172 
UK  514.6  103.6  58.2  87.9 18.9  81.1  12,822  490 
US  491.0  101.8  45.2  83.6 23.3  76.7  5,563  163 
Late tracking  
countries
2  503.9  98.4  54.5  78.7 24.7  75.3  154,732  5,041 
OECD
1  506.4  97.9  60.1  74.9 31.0  69.0  202,817  6,728 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
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Table 2: Distribution of institutional variables in OECD countries









Share of schools 
not tracking by 
ability 
Share of  
students enrolled in 
vocational programs 












Austria  10  0.87  0.60  0.44  0.69  0.22 
Germany  10  0.89  0.59  0.00  0.40  0.65 
Czech Rep.  11  0.91  0.35  0.43  0.45  0.20 
Hungary  11  0.81  0.31  0.62  0.70  0.01 
Slovak Rep.  11  0.88  0.25  0.46  0.50  0.17 
Belgium  12  0.37  0.56  0.47  0.26  0.02 
Netherlands  12  0.32  0.19  0.30  0.66  0.10 
Switzerland  12  0.93  0.24  0.07  0.54  0.82 
Early tracking  
countries
2     0.79  0.47  0.20  0.47  0.43 
Luxembourg  13  0.85  0.27  0.13  0.41  0.42 
Italy  14  0.92  0.54  0.57  0.07  0.11 
Korea  14  0.55  0.12  0.24  0.60  0.22 
Greece  15  0.95  0.89  0.15  0.05  0.71 
Ireland  15  0.40  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.42 
Japan  15  0.74  0.44  0.24  0.87  0.20 
Portugal  15  0.89  0.48  0.14  0.06  0.56 
Australia  16  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.09  0.42 
Canada  16  0.85  0.08  0.00  0.11  0.78 
Denmark  16  0.63  0.16  0.00  0.03  0.55 
Finland  16  0.96  0.49  0.00  0.04  0.75 
Iceland  16  0.96  0.15  0.00  0.01  0.94 
Norway  16  0.96  0.58  0.00  0.00  0.78 
New Zealand  16  0.93  0.03  0.00  0.10  0.50 
Poland  16  0.97  0.53  0.00  0.13  0.83 
Spain  16  0.53  0.29  0.00  0.03  0.68 
Sweden  16  0.88  0.24  0.00  0.01  0.58 
UK  16  0.74  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.61 
US  16  0.87  0.12  0.00  0.08  0.81 
Late tracking  
countries
2     0.82  0.23  0.09  0.22  0.60 
OECD
1     0.82  0.26  0.11  0.26  0.57 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Weighted averages by sample sizes. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 








 Peer Heterogeneity, School Tracking and Students’ Performances: Evidence from PISA 2006 
 
  19
Table 3: Distribution of escs and foreign students in OECD countries











deviation of the 
mean escs by 
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Mean of the 
standard 
deviations of 

















Austria  0.23  0.83  0.46  0.69  0.13  0.12  0.10 
Germany  0.32  0.92  0.48  0.79  0.15  0.17  0.13 
Czech Rep.  0.07  0.75  0.37  0.66  0.09  0.02  0.02 
Hungary  -0.01  0.90  0.55  0.71  0.11  0.02  0.01 
Slovak Rep.  -0.10  0.88  0.48  0.73  0.13  0.00  0.14 
Belgium  0.18  0.91  0.48  0.77  0.14  0.13  0.19 
Netherlands  0.25  0.89  0.46  0.77  0.13  0.11  0.07 
Switzerland  0.10  0.88  0.40  0.79  0.14  0.23  0.19 
 Early tracking  
countries
2  0.23  0.90  0.49  0.76  0.15  0.13  0.12 
Luxembourg  0.10  1.10  0.53  0.96  0.13  0.37  0.91 
Italy  -0.05  0.97  0.50  0.84  0.13  0.04  0.13 
Korea  -0.01  0.81  0.42  0.69  0.10  0.00  0.00 
Greece  -0.09  0.95  0.52  0.80  0.13  0.05  0.03 
Ireland  -0.01  0.85  0.41  0.75  0.11  0.08  0.06 
Japan  -0.01  0.69  0.35  0.60  0.08  0.00  0.00 
Portugal  -0.52  1.28  0.73  1.05  0.19  0.05  0.02 
Australia  0.21  0.77  0.39  0.67  0.09  0.22  0.09 
Canada  0.37  0.80  0.37  0.71  0.12  0.23  0.15 
Denmark  0.30  0.89  0.36  0.82  0.14  0.08  0.07 
Finland  0.25  0.79  0.28  0.74  0.11  0.02  0.02 
Iceland  0.82  0.86  0.30  0.81  0.10  0.03  0.03 
Norway  0.43  0.75  0.29  0.69  0.14  0.08  0.08 
New Zealand  0.09  0.82  0.37  0.73  0.12  0.21  0.09 
Poland  -0.31  0.86  0.41  0.76  0.11  0.00  0.01 
Spain  -0.31  1.07  0.60  0.89  0.16  0.07  0.16 
Sweden  0.23  0.78  0.31  0.72  0.14  0.11  0.09 
UK  0.19  0.81  0.39  0.71  0.11  0.10  0.06 
US  0.15  0.91  0.48  0.77  0.13  0.17  0.12 
Late tracking  
countries
2  0.07  0.89  0.48  0.74  0.14  0.11  0.08 
OECD
1  0.09  0.89  0.49  0.74  0.14  0.11  0.09 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
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   ST-0  ST-1  ST-2  ST-3  ST-4  ST-5 
  50.04  49.72  66.84  67.18  44.48 
  2.58  2.56  5.88  6.00  2.78  Average Escs  
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   -9.47    -11.83  -18.57 
   6.54    6.23  6.68  Escs standard deviation 
      0.148     0.057  0.005 
    -20.15  -21.04   
     6.48  6.66    Average Escs squared  
         0.002  0.002    
      26.00 
      3.66  Early track* AverageEscs 
              0.000 
       35.79 
       5.68  Early track* Escs standard deviation 
              0.000 
Groups of Control Variables
4         
Individual characteristics  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Family background  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Peer composition    √  √  √  √  √ 
School location and size  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
School resources  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Institutions  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Country level controls  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Number of observations  174,921  174,921  174,921  174,921  174,921  174,921
F  183.69  178.95  175.8  182.88  179.95  182.76 
Prob.>F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.307  0.340  0.340  0.341  0.341  0.343 
 1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA 
database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – 
adjusted for clustering at the school level - and the third to the P value. 
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are 
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Table 5: Students performances OECD countries
1: robustness checks. OLS regressions
2, 3 
 
   ST-5 Math  ST-5 Reading  ST-5a 
44.06  53.89  40.38 
3.05  2.65  7.71  Average Escs 
0.000  0.000  0.000 
-19.78  -22.12  -17.47 
7.64  6.35  7.34  Escs standard deviation 
0.010  0.000  0.017 
32.07  24.62  9.75 
4.16  4.01  12.21  Early track* Average Escs 
0.000  0.000  0.425 
50.55  13.07  26.15 
6.00  6.33  12.55  Early track* Escs standard deviation 
0.000  0.039  0.037 
Groups of Control Variables
4      
Individual characteristics  √  √  √ 
Family background  √  √  √ 
Peer composition  √  √  √ 
School location and size  √  √  √ 
School resources  √  √  √ 
Institutions  √  √  √ 
Country level controls  √  √   
Country fixed effect     √ 
Pseudo-School fixed effects
5     √ 
School additional controls     √ 
Number of observations  174,921  170,713  153,483 
F  203.74  197.48  175.58 
Prob.>F  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.3913  0.3844  0.3633 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. Data on scores in reading are not provided for US.
2 Regressions are run 
using students sample weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated 
coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the school level - and the third to the P 
value. 
4  Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. 
5  Pseudo-School fixed effects are 
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Table 6A: Students performances in science in OECD countries




   ST-1  ST-2  ST-2 vocat  ST-2a  ST-3  
No early  Early  No early  Early  No early  Early  No early  Early  No early  Early    
track  track  track  track  track  track  track  track  track  track 
45.80  61.83  45.05  61.56  43.97  61.32  41.97  48.83  64.16  78.41 
2.95  3.86  2.93  3.85  2.97  4.14  7.53  8.91  6.73  7.54  Average Escs 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
      -17.65  13.73  -10.70  14.28  -19.00  12.61       
      7.57  8.57  7.99  9.81  7.27  9.58        Escs standard deviation 
      0.020  0.109  0.180  0.146  0.009  0.188       
            27.23  2.16             
            7.81  6.20              Vocational * Average Escs 
            0.000  0.728             
            -73.96  -3.77             
            20.70  15.45              Vocational * Escs standard deviation 
            0.000  0.807             
                        -22.35  -18.60 
                        7.44  7.60  Average Escs squared 
                        0.003  0.014 
Groups of Control Variables
4                               
Individual characteristics  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Family background  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Peer composition  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
School location and size  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
School resources  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Institutions  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Country level controls  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Pseudo-School fixed effects
5              √  √     
School additional controls              √  √     
Number of observations  132,104  42,817  132,104  42,817  132,104  42,817  117,808  35,675  132,104  42,817 
F  120.88  147.40  120.55  149.84  120.02  145.77  79.56  154.57  125.46  152.23 
Prob.>F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.313  0.546  0.314  0.546  0.315  0.546  0.338  0.549  0.315  0.546 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the 
estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the school level - and the third to the P value. 
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are 
included in all regressions. 
5 Pseudo-School fixed effects are identified, for each country, according to the quintile of escs average of every school. Source: elaborations on PISA 
2006 data. 
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   ST-1  ST-2  ST-2 vocat  ST-2a  ST-3 
No early  Early  No early  Early  No early  Early  No early  Early  No early  Early    
track  track  track  track  track  track  track  track  track  track 
54.19  61.83  53.09  61.56  52.26  61.32  49.32  48.83  62.45  78.41 
3.74  3.86  3.67  3.85  3.75  4.14  9.21  8.91  8.74  7.54  Average Escs 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    -15.86  13.73  -7.06  14.28  -19.90  12.61     
    8.84  8.57  9.53  9.81  8.42  9.58      Escs standard deviation 
    0.073  0.109  0.459  0.146  0.018  0.188     
        24.46  2.16         
        8.74  6.20          Vocational * Average Escs 
        0.005  0.728         
        -77.78  -3.77         
        21.81  15.45          Vocational * Escs standard deviation 
        0.000  0.807         
                -10.66  -18.60 
                11.00  7.60  Average Escs squared 
                0.332  0.014 
Groups of Control Variables
4                     
Individual characteristics  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Family background  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Peer composition  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
School location and size  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
School resources  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Institutions  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Country level controls  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Pseudo-School fixed effects
5              √  √     
School additional controls              √  √     
Number of observations  105,003  42,817  105,003  42,817  105,003  42,817  93,423  35,675  105,003  42,817 
F  87.61  147.40  87.39  149.84  87.59  145.77  66.73  154.57  89.14  152.23 
Prob.>F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.319  0.546  0.319  0.546  0.321  0.546  0.339  0.549  0.319  0.546 
1 Countries with a mean escs lower than -0.3 – Portugal, Spain and Poland – are excluded together with Mexico, Turkey and France. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample 
weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the 
school level - and the third to the P value. 
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. 
5 Pseudo-School fixed effects are identified, for each country, 
according to the quintile of escs average of every school. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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   SC-1  SC-2  SC-2a  SC-2:  
No early track 
SC-2:  
Early track 
81.68  73.64  70.83  76.30  78.18 
2.93  3.17  3.36  3.36  5.01  Average Escs 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-13.36 -29.68 -36.48 -32.64  15.34 
7.49  6.50  6.97  6.89  8.89  Escs standard deviation 
0.075  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.084 
   27.11  21.13       
   5.18  5.12        Early track * Average Escs 
   0.000  0.000       
   40.98  52.82       
   8.78  14.07        Early track* Escs standard deviation 
   0.000  0.000       
Groups of Control Variables        
School location and size  √  √  √  √  √ 
School composition  √  √  √  √  √ 
School resources  √  √  √  √  √ 
Institutions  √  √  √  √  √ 
School additional controls  √  √  √  √  √ 
Country level controls  √  √    √  √ 
Country fixed effects     √    
Number of observations  5,098  5,098  5,098  3,846  1,252 
F  65.95  69.24  68.49  42.84  78.42 
Prob.>F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.628  0.640  0.669  0.580  0.812 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using school sample weights provided in 
PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated coefficient, the second to the robust 



















Table 8: Students performances in science in OECD countries
1 by early and no early 
tracking countries. Estimated coefficients by model ST-2 of “Averageescs” and “Escs 
standard deviation”. Quantile regressions
2 
 
  Average Escs  Escs standard deviation 
Percentile  No early track countries  Early track countries No early track countries  Early track countries
10  46.38***  63.75***  -22.38***  16.18*** 
20  45.36***  61.40***  -22.60***  15.38*** 
30  45.89***  60.94***  -18.40***  8.39*** 
40  46.39***  58.28***  -23.56***  12.06*** 
50  45.29***  60.57***  -24.54***  11.75*** 
60  44.12***  63.20***  -21.35***  7.44*** 
70  45.01***  60.97***  -15.79***  12.52*** 
80  42.11***  59.29***  -16.43***  11.27*** 
90  41.08***  57.26***  -12.42***  22.05*** 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in 
PISA database.Robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the school level have been computed. 
Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. *** 99% significance level. Source: 
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Fig. 1: Quantile regressions on students performances in science in OECD countries. Estimated coefficients of 
"Average Escs”. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data
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Fig. 2: Quantile regressions on students performances in science in OECD countries. Estimated coefficients of “Escs 
standard deviation”. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data
No early track countries Early track countries  
 
 





Table A1: Control variables used in regressions 
 
School level controls 
Location and Class Sizes 
School Location   4 dummies: village, small town, town, city (large city is the omitted modality) 
Class sizes  5 dummies: less than 15, 16-20, 26-30, 31-35, more than 35 (21-25 is the omitted modality) 
Resources 
Ratcomp  Ratio of computers to school size 
Compweb  Proportion of computers connected to web 
Stratio Student-Teacher  ratio 
Scmatedu  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Quality of educational resources" 
Tcshort Quantitative  index  provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Teacher shortage" (on a negative scale) 
Institutions 
Respres  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Responsibility for resource allocation index" 
Respcurr  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Responsibility for curriculum & assessment" 
School type  3 dummies: public, private dependent, private independent ("missing school type" is the omitted modality, due to the several missing 
values of the school type variable) 
Residence  Dummy variable showing if residence is a prerequisite or a high priority for being admitted to the school 
Student record  Dummy variable showing if previous academic  records (or a specific test) are a prerequisite or a high priority for being admitted to the 
school 
N.B. the dummies on the single components of school autonomy and responsibility about resource and curricula (the modalities of the scq11 Pisa questionnaire) have 
not been included because of the several missing values. Replacing these variables with the respres and respcurr indexes (with much less missing values) does not 
alter regression results. 
School Additional Controls 
Sorting by ability  Two dummies from the 3 modalities of the ability group variable showing, respectively, if students are grouped according to their abilities 
within schools for all subjects of for some subjects 
School competition  Two dummies capturing the degree of school competition in the area. 
Principal evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are used in the evaluation of the principal's performance 
Teacher evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are used in the evaluation of teachers' performance 
Allocation evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are used in decisions about instructional resource allocation to the school 
Over time evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are tracked over time by an administrative authority 
 Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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Tab. A1: Control variables used in regressions (suite) 
 
School composition 
Average age   Average age of interviewed students  
Share of females  Share of females among interviewed students  
Share of immigrants  Share of immigrants among interviewed students  
Share of "foreign languages"  Share of interviewed students which speak a foreign language at home. 
Share of vocational students  Share of interviewed students enrolled in a vocational program. 
Average Escs   Average level of the escs index of interviewed students  
Escs standard deviation  Standard deviation (corrected for the country escs standard deviation) of the escs index of interviewed students  
Average Escs squared  Square of the average level of the escs index of interviewed students 
N.B. in regressions at student level these variables (apart from escs standard deviation) are considered net of the individual responses. 
Country level controls 
Gdp per capita   
Spending in education per capita 
Share of students enrolled to pre-primary school 
Age of first track   
Early track  Dummy variable: 1 if school track occurs before age 13, 0 otherwise 
Duration of pre-primary schools  In years 
External exam  Share of students subjected to an external evaluation in science 
Standard test  Share of students subjected to standard evaluation tests in science 




Grade  Students below grade 8 and beyond grade 11 are excluded from the sample; hence, grade is captured by 3 dummies 
Vocational  Dummy variable: 1 if the student is enrolled in a vocational program, 0 otherwise 
Isced 3  Dummy variable: 1 if the student is enrolled in an upper secondary, 0 otherwise 
Immigrant  Dummy variable: 1 if the student was not born in the country of test, 0 otherwise 
Foreign Language  Dummy variable: 1 if the student speaks a foreign language at home, 0 otherwise 
 




Table A1: Control variables used in regressions (suite) 
 
Family background 
Hisei  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset showing "the highest parental occupational status" 
Pared  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset showing (in years) "the highest parental educational level" 
Homepos  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "home possessions" 
Books at 
home 
Five dummies on number of books: 11-25, 26-100, 101-200, 201-500, more than 500 (less than 11 is the omitted modality)  




One dummy for each imputed variable (concerning escs, pared, hisei, homepos, immigrant, foreign language) showing if the value has been imputed 
Slope 
dummies 
One dummy for each imputed variable (concerning escs, pared, hisei, homepos, immigrant, foreign language) showing the interaction between the 
intercept imputation dummy and the value of the imputed variable 
Source: information provided by PISA 2006, OECD and UNESCO datasets, Brunello and Checchi (2007), Woessmann et al. (2009) 
 
 